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When reform negotiations in international organizations (IOs) produce limited substantive 
progress, the diagnosis is typically a lack of political will. We identify a different dynamic: in 
protracted negotiations, international policy paradigms can emerge that enshrine a politically 
realistic but incomplete issue definition and thereby focus the debate on a subset of policy 
instruments that do not fully address the underlying problem. We draw on the multilateral 
negotiations literature to show how policy paradigms – which are widely explored in Comparative 
Politics, but largely neglected in International Relations – can emerge even in heterogenous IOs, 
where deep cognitive cohesion is unlikely. The risk of negotiation failure incentivizes negotiators 
to adopt and maintain “achievable” issue and goal definitions, which over time are accepted as 
axiomatic by diplomats, IO officials, and policy experts. The resulting international policy 
paradigms help avoid institutional paralysis, but also impede ambitious and necessary reforms. To 
establish the empirical plausibility of this argument, we highlight the contemporary international 
policy paradigm of rapid deployment in UN peacekeeping, which focuses on establishing an initial 
brigade-sized presence rather than on rapid deployment of the full peacekeeping force. Drawing 
on primary documents and interviews, we identify the roots of this “First Brigade” policy paradigm 
in reactions to the UN’s failure to respond to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and trace its 
consolidation during UN reform negotiations in the 2000s and early 2010s. We also demonstrate 
that an alternative explanation of the paradigm as reflecting operational lessons-learned does not 
hold: a brigade-sized initial presence is rarely sufficient for mandate implementation, does not 
reliably speed up full deployment, and creates risks for peacekeepers. By highlighting the existence 
and impact of international policy paradigms, our study adds to scholarship on the role of ideas in 
International Relations and provides a novel perspective on reform negotiations in IOs. 
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International organizations (IOs) often face major challenges, including mitigating climate 
change, controlling global epidemics, and – our focus in this article – rapidly deploying 
peacekeeping missions to respond to crises. Yet member states are frequently reluctant to commit 
substantial resources to address these challenges. How do IOs respond to such intractable 
problems? We argue that sometimes advocates for a solution redefine the issue, emphasizing 
policy goals and institutional reforms that are politically feasible over those that comprehensively 
capture the policy challenge and are most likely to address it. We identify the emergence of 
international policy paradigms anchored by such “achievable” policy goals and argue that they 
may impede progress on difficult issues in large IOs. 
Policy paradigms – conceptual frameworks in which the definition of a policy issue implies a 
particular policy goal and set of policy options (Hall 1993) – are widely explored in Comparative 
Politics but largely neglected in International Relations, especially in the context of large, 
heterogeneous IOs where deep cognitive cohesion is unlikely (Princen and van Esch 2016, 356-
7). In the first substantive section of this article, we draw on multilateral negotiation theory to 
argue in that policy paradigms nevertheless provide a relevant explanatory framework in large IOs. 
They emerge and persist because of – rather than despite – heterogeneity among IO actors: policy 
paradigms help prevent a continuous return to paralyzing definitional debates as member states, 
Secretariat officials and experts negotiate a common response to pressing challenges. 
Simultaneously, however, policy paradigms can impede reform efforts by entrenching an 
expedient but incomplete issue definition that focuses attention on a subset of policy instruments 
that do not fully address the underlying problem. By concentrating on what is politically 
achievable, advocates for a solution risk losing sight of what is necessary in practice. This 
downward adjustment of policy ambitions (“aiming low” dynamics) means that lengthy reform 
processes – even if successfully implemented – may ultimately produce only limited results. 
The UN rapid deployment case establishes the plausibility of this argument. There is broad 
consensus that rapid deployment is critical to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping, but member 
states have long resisted reforms that would guarantee a UN rapid reaction capability (UN 2000, 
§90; Langille 2014, 2-3). Nevertheless, states, UN officials, and policy experts have continued to 
propose, debate, and even implement measures aimed at enhancing UN rapid deployment. 
Drawing on primary documents and nine semi-structured interviews with key policymakers (Table 
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A.1), we document in the second substantive section of this article that by the 2010s this debate 
was taking place within an international policy paradigm. Participants advocated differing rapid 
deployment mechanisms, but converged on a common goal definition: they overwhelmingly 
equated rapid deployment with a rapid initial response, usually involving a brigade-size presence 
established within a 30-90 day timeframe.2 Far less attention was paid to the expeditious 
deployment of the whole authorized force. We call this the First Brigade policy paradigm of UN 
rapid deployment.  
We show empirically (in the third section) that there is no convincing operational-functionalist 
explanation for the emergence of the First Brigade policy paradigm: it does not represent a 
distillation of ‘best practices’ for rapid deployment learned from UN peacekeeping experience. 
UN peacekeeping missions are routinely mandated to deploy far more than one brigade, and such 
troop ceilings typically underestimate rather than overestimate mission personnel requirements. 
Rapid deployment of an initial presence does not reliably speed up the deployment of the whole 
force. Indeed, missions established in the 2010s, following two decades of efforts to improve UN 
rapid deployment, deployed more swiftly initially but took longer than missions in the 1990s or 
2000s to reach full deployment. Moreover, an extended gap between initial partial deployment and 
the arrival of the full force creates additional challenges, encouraging spoilers and generating 
popular disappointment.  
It is “aiming low” dynamics – driven by considerations of political feasibility rather than 
operational requirements – that account for the emergence of the First Brigade policy paradigm, 
as we demonstrate in the fourth section. The focus on rapidly deploying a first brigade is rooted in 
the 1990s, notably in reactions to the UN’s failure to respond to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. This 
focus was contested in the 2000 Brahimi Report, but the failure of that report’s more ambitious 
rapid deployment definition – full deployment within 30-90 days – cemented views that aiming 
beyond the first brigade was politically impossible. By the time of UN’s most recent major reform, 
the 2015 creation of the Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System (PCRS), the focus on a first 
brigade was axiomatic. 
                                                 
2 After 2015 this timeframe was largely standardized to 60 days (see below). 
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This article makes two theoretical contributions. First, we add to work on the impact of ideas 
in international politics by demonstrating the applicability of the policy paradigm concept, 
especially in large, heterogeneous IOs. Going beyond more commonly employed terms in 
International Relations, like organizational culture, the concept highlights that multilateral 
negotiations may be shaped by relatively stable – but not necessarily optimal – understandings of 
the policy problem that are shared not only by international bureaucrats but also by national 
diplomats and independent policy experts.  
 Second, we highlight that international policy paradigms can hamper the search for 
institutional solutions to difficult challenges in large IOs. Dominant perspectives on IO evolution 
often focus either on member states’ conflicting agendas or bureaucratic inertia as impediments to 
such reforms. We show another dynamic, in which actors may genuinely seek an effective solution 
but a flawed initial diagnosis of the policy problem undermines their effort. Our single case does 
not allow us to estimate how prevalent policy paradigms are across contemporary IOs, but there is 
no theoretical reason to believe UN rapid deployment to be an isolated case. Our intention is thus 
to open the way for more systematic investigation of how frequently and severely international 
policy paradigms impede the quest for multilateral solutions to today’s problems. 
At the same time, we shed important light on a key policy debate in UN peacekeeping. The 
First Brigade policy paradigm alone does not explain the UN’s rapid deployment challenges: 
member states’ unwillingness or inability to supply UN peacekeepers quickly deserve further study 
(Lundgren et al. 2018), supplementing existing literature on why states choose to contribute 
peacekeepers in general (Bove and Elia 2011; Bellamy and Williams 2013; Coleman and Nyblade 
2018). However, by equating rapid deployment with the challenge of swiftly establishing an initial 
presence, the First Brigade policy paradigm focuses reform efforts on a series of purported 
solutions that do not address the fundamental problem of deploying the entire force in a timely 
manner.  
 
Intractable Problems, Reform Efforts, and Policy Paradigms in IOs 
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IOs routinely confront politically intractable policy problems: solutions may exist, but states 
are unable or unwilling to adopt them or furnish the resources to implement them. UN rapid 
deployment exemplifies this phenomenon. It is critical to peacekeeping success, helping operations 
establish credibility, deter violence, discourage spoilers, and sustain progress towards 
reconciliation (Durch et al. 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Whalan 2013; Langille 2014). 
Mandate implementation depends on the expeditious arrival of the authorized force: “a mission’s 
ability to fulfill mandated goals changes as it is progressively outfitted with its necessary 
components” (Hultman et al. 2013, 876). Rapid full deployment cannot guarantee an operation’s 
success – other factors including the mandate, size, composition, access, awareness of local 
dynamics, and actual activities also matter (Bove et al. 2020; Fjelde et al. 2019; Fortna 2008; 
Howard 2008; Karim and Beardsley 2017; Murdie and Davis 2010; Smidt 2020; Steinert and 
Grimm 2014) – but slow deployment threatens it (Hardt 2014). 
 While it is logistically difficult to quickly deploy thousands of troops into a crisis situation, it 
is not impossible. States do so when they are at war, and there is even precedent for UN rapid 
deployment: in 1960, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) deployed 14,000 peacekeepers in 
five weeks (Jones et al. 2009). For decades, however, member states have been unwilling to make 
binding commitments for rapid deployment or create a standing UN military capability (Langille 
2014, 2-3). Consequently, rapid deployment “continues to be one of the most vexing operational 
challenges for UN peacekeeping” (UNDPKO 2016, 7). 
There are several ways IOs can react to intractable policy problems. They can cease working 
on the issue. They can engage in organized hypocrisy – adopting decisions that rhetorically address 
the issue without taking substantive action (Brunsson 1989) – or create “empty institutions” that 
deflect attention from the lack of progress (Dimitrov 2019). Alternatively, diplomats, secretariat 
officials, and experts may persist in their advocacy for an institutional remedy. If they succeed in 
keeping the issue on the agenda, they will trigger a policy debate, often protracted, both within the 
IO and in the broader policy community. We argue that such protracted policy debates provide 
fertile ground for the emergence of international policy paradigms, even – perhaps especially – in 
large, heterogeneous IOs.  
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In Hall’s seminal definition, a policy paradigm is “a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, 
but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing” (1993, 279). Hall’s focus 
was on British macroeconomic policy-making, but the concept subsequently found wider 
application and became “the enduring workhorse of the comparative public policy field” (Kay 
2011, 143), highlighting that national policy debates often occur within a stable overarching 
structure. Broadly accepted problem and goal definitions anchor these debates; together with 
causal beliefs about the consequences of particular actions, they define which strategies are 
recognized as part of the policy “toolbox” and which are left out of consideration. Importantly, 
policy paradigms admit considerable debate, because causal beliefs can evolve. Within a stable 
policy paradigm, however, the debate is about means rather than ends: the question is whether 
existing policies can be adjusted to better address the acknowledged problem and reach the 
accepted goal.3 The strongest empirical evidence for the existence of a policy paradigm, therefore, 
is when policy debates feature little to no disagreement on issue and goal definitions, even as 
participants disagree profoundly regarding policy tools. 
Transposing this concept into the international context, we hold that an international policy 
paradigm exists when the state and non-state actors engaged in international efforts to address a 
specific challenge broadly agree on the issue definition and policy goal, so that negotiations 
revolve primarily around means for achieving that goal. In the UN context, relevant actors include 
diplomats representing member states, UN officials, and the “Third UN” of experts and consultants 
(Weiss et al. 2009).  
The notion of international policy paradigms usefully complements cognate concepts in 
International Relations theory. Constructivists have long highlighted issue definition and framing 
as critical to norm advocacy (Price 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Payne 2001). The 
international policy paradigm concept elucidates how the impact of such efforts may extend 
beyond norm emergence into policy implementation debates: if widely adopted by policymakers, 
definitions and framing generate a shared diagnosis of the problem and policy goals to anchor a 
                                                 
3 Hall (1993, 279-80) calls policy adjustments “first order changes” and new policies “second-order changes.” A key 
question for Comparative Politics has been how to conceptualize “third-order” changes, i.e. changes of rather than 




nascent policy paradigm. Epistemic communities, defined as transnational experts united by shared 
understandings of a policy challenge and causal beliefs about how to address it (Haas 1992), can 
be understood to revolve around transnational policy paradigms. If they successfully entrench their 
ideas among key officials and diplomats within a given IO, an international policy paradigm arises. 
Similarly, as long as organizational culture, defined as “the rules, rituals, and beliefs that are 
embedded in the organization” (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 719), affects only an international 
bureaucracy, it has a narrower base than international policy paradigms.4 By contrast, Autesserre’s 
(2010, 11) notion of peacebuilding culture as “a set of ideologies, rules, rituals, 
assumptions, definitions, paradigms, and standard operating procedures” shared by UN officials, 
national diplomats, and humanitarian workers points to the existence of an international policy 
paradigm in this field. 
Despite its cogency, the policy paradigm concept has attracted far less attention among IR 
scholars than in Comparative Politics. It is sometimes used to analyze foreign policy (e.g. Hassan 
2017), and transnational policy paradigms have been detected in the European Union (Princen and 
van Esch 2016; Juncos 2017) and the international financial institutions (Babb 2013; Güven 2018; 
Kaya and Reay 2019). To our knowledge, the possibility of policy paradigms emerging within the 
UN has not yet been explored analytically.5 International organizations with “a large number of 
veto players with often strongly diverging interests, and power politics between member states” 
are seen as “unlikely candidate[s] for paradigmatic policy-making” (Princen and van Esch 2016, 
356-7). This mirrors research on groupthink in IOs, which argues that this dysfunction is most 
likely in small and homogenous decision-makers’ groups (Woods 2004). The cognitive coherence 
seen to be fundamental to policy paradigms has so far been expected only in the highly integrated 
European Union (Skogstad 2011, 110; Princen and van Esch 2016) or in the international financial 
institutions as a result of severe power concentrations (Babb 2013) and staff cohesion (Chwieroth 
2008).  
By contrast, we draw on multilateral negotiations scholarship to argue that policy paradigms 
not only can emerge in heterogeneous IOs but may play an important role in their functioning – 
                                                 
4 Organizational culture also arguably has a wider substantive focus than implied in the concept of international policy 
paradigm, since IOs typically address multiple policy challenges. 
5 Martin and Owen (2010) trace the rise and fall of the human security “policy paradigm” in the UN and the EU but 
offer little theoretical analysis of the concept. 
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while also potentially producing problematic effects. Negotiation scholars have long recognized 
“inventing and choosing among alternative definitions of the problem” as a critical element of pre-
negotiation (Zartman 1989, 246; see also Zartman and Berman 1982, 95-6; Stein 1989, 485-7) that 
frames and structures subsequent negotiation phases. This is especially important in complex 
multilateral settings (Jönsson 2002, 222), where unresolved differences about problem definitions 
can impede negotiation progress (e.g. Hansen 2006, 25-7). In protracted multilateral negotiations 
– with multiple formal or informal rounds – several factors militate against returning to pre-
negotiation on issue definitions for each successive cycle. Previously used definitions offer focal 
points (Schelling 1980, 68) on which negotiators can converge. It is “standard practice” for 
participants in recurring multilateral negotiations to fall back on “already agreed-upon text” to 
resolve impasses (Schmitt 2017, 514). Protracted negotiations often foreclose further definitional 
debate in order to maintain forward momentum: members of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change no longer revisit debates about whether climate change is anthropogenic; review 
meetings under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants do not renegotiate the 
definition of these pollutants.6 By contrast, a draft convention on terrorism that had been before a 
UN committee for years reached a stalemate due to the absence of a universally accepted definition 
of the term (UN 2019a). In short, in protracted multilateral policy negotiations, locating debate 
within the parameters of an accepted issue definition – in other words, within a policy paradigm – 
is a means to manage complexity, avoid paralysis, and allow negotiators to focus on fine-tuning 
policy proposals. 
Actors participating in negotiations within large, heterogeneous IOs may therefore 
pragmatically accept a policy paradigm. They may also see a benefit in not re-opening a 
fundamental debate that could jeopardize previous negotiation victories, or resign themselves to 
the existing paradigm as reflecting the prevailing distribution of power (Hall 1993, 280; Payne 
2001; Babb 2013, 271). Over time, actors that have invested resources in a particular approach to 
the problem may become attached to the policy paradigm (Skogstad 2011, 95), mirroring 
discussions on “sunk costs” in institutions (Pierson 1996). Would-be policy reformers may also 
recognize that working from previously agreed problem definitions and policy goal improves their 
proposals’ chances (Thakur 2017; Coleman 2017). In addition, international policy paradigms may 
                                                 
6 Thanks to Dr. Jen Allan, Cardiff University, for this information.  
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persist for cognitive reasons. Issue and goal definitions may become “internalized” and “taken-
for-granted” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895; Babb 2013, 271). As Jacobs notes, even highly 
motivated negotiators have to rely on pre-existing “mental models” in complex issue areas (2009, 
252). Subconsciously, moreover, decision-makers may be predisposed to believe that politically 
acceptable issue and problem definitions also have the advantage of inherent quality (Jervis 2017, 
128; see also Autesserre 2017, 120-1). These various dynamics help explain why “continuous 
negotiations… develop a culture, behavioural norms and a language of their own” (Jönsson 2002, 
223). 
Yet while policy paradigms may allow large IOs to avoid paralysis, they can also become 
obstacles to more far-reaching reforms. Policy paradigms vary in the degree to which their issue 
definitions and policy goals capture the key characteristics of the underlying problem, and there 
exists a risk of policymakers becoming “entrapped” in counter-productive policy paradigms (e.g. 
Larsen 2002). In policy paradigms that arise out of complex multilateral negotiations, problem 
definitions and policy goals may reflect negotiation dynamics rather than close analysis of the 
issue. A partial problem definition adopted as a compromise in one negotiation round may 
subsequently emerge as a focal point and come to anchor a policy paradigm, crowding out more 
ambitious ones that may then be rejected out of hand as politically unachievable and potentially 
destabilizing of progress to date.7 Any failed attempts to advocate more ambitious problem 
definitions will reinforce this dynamic, as will perceptions that states’ commitment to resolving an 
issue is tenuous or ebbing. Ironically, the incentive to “aim low” may be especially high among 
committed advocates of reform, who have the most at stake in protecting past gains and ensuring 
that negotiations do not founder. 
Yet an international policy paradigm anchored by issue definitions and policy goals that only 
partially capture the empirical problem risks biasing the debate in counterproductive ways: policies 
that incompletely address the underlying issue may be added to the “toolbox” while superior 
policies are sidelined or ignored. Autesserre (2010) notes, for example, that the predominant 
“peacebuilding culture” – which we suggest above includes an international policy paradigm – has 
                                                 
7 This echoes insights that “means [may] become ends in themselves” in IO bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore 
1999, 720) and that “a widely endorsed weak norm [may] ruin the chances of establishing a stronger norm later” 
(Coleman 2013, 172). 
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undermined the UN-led efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo by precluding full 
recognition of how local conflicts fuel country-wide violence (a flawed issue definition) and 
perpetuating emphasis on national reconciliation and elections (an incomplete set of purported 
solutions), which could only partially address the underlying problem of country-level violence. 
Similarly, we observe a restrictive issue definition and incomplete set of purported solutions in 
contemporary debates on UN rapid deployment. 
 
The First Brigade International Policy Paradigm of UN Rapid Deployment 
The contemporary debate about enhancing the UN’s peacekeeping rapid deployment capacity 
illustrates both the existence of international policy paradigms and their potentially problematic 
origins in multilateral negotiation dynamics rather than analysis of the requirements for addressing 
issue at hand. This section demonstrates the existence of an international policy paradigm of UN 
rapid deployment in the 2010s, while the two subsequent sections make the case that this paradigm 
arose not from operational experience but from “aiming low” dynamics in protracted multilateral 
negotiations. 
 As argued above, the strongest empirical evidence for a policy paradigm is when participants 
in a debate share a largely unquestioned acceptance of the basic issue definition and policy goal 
even when advocating different instruments to achieve that goal. This was the case for international 
debate about UN rapid deployment in the 2010s. This debate included UN Secretariat officials, 
state diplomats, and members of think tanks and universities. Participants advocated three distinct 
rapid deployment mechanisms: standby arrangements, standing capabilities, and partnership with 
regional IOs.8 Yet they shared a definition of rapid deployment as rapid initial deployment and the 
policy goal of enabling the rapid establishment of an initial, typically brigade-sized, mission 
presence.  
 Standby arrangements have long been the UN’s privileged rapid deployment mechanism. 
They allow states to indicate in advance what capabilities they might be willing to deploy to a UN 
                                                 
8 Some reform proposals combined several mechanisms. 
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operation. States maintain control of these capabilities, however, and make case-by-case decisions 
about their actual deployment. UN standby arrangements emerged in the 1960s (Macfarlane 2007) 
but remained weakly institutionalized throughout the Cold War. They drew renewed policy 
attention with the expansion of peacekeeping in the early post-Cold War period. UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali urged states to enhance standby arrangements in 1992 (UNSG 
1992, §51), and the General Assembly established the UN Standby Arrangements System 
(UNSAS) in 1993. Despite the initial enthusiasm for the mechanism (Boutros-Ghali 1999, 27-8) 
and pledges totaling 108,400 personnel by 2013 (OMA 2013, 6), UNSAS proved flawed in two 
respects. First, states were reluctant to approve deployment requests for pledged troops. In May 
1994, when the UN expanded its peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in the wake of the country’s 
genocide, “not one of the 19 Governments that at that time had undertaken to have troops on stand-
by agreed to contribute” (UNSG 1995, §43). Second, when states were willing to deploy pledged 
capabilities, the UN frequently found that units had training and equipment gaps. In 2000, the 
Brahimi Report argued that “UNSAS… has yet to become a dependable supply of resources.” (UN 
2000, 14). By the 2010s, there was widespread consensus that UNSAS was “not meeting its 
envisaged purposes as a planning and force-generation tool or as a platform to facilitate rapid 
deployment” (Smith and Boutellis 2013, 12).  
Some participants in the 2010s policy debate advocated improvements to UN standby 
arrangements, notably a narrower focus on small initial deployments. One prominent report 
proposed “refin[ing] the scope of UNSAS, limiting it to only critical enablers… and/or capabilities 
for key stages of a mission (such as start-up or surge)” (Smith and Boutellis 2013, 15). The 2015 
High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) recommended a small, regionally-
based UN “vanguard capability” for quick insertion into a new or escalating crisis (UN 2015, 
§199).9 It did not specify this capability’s size, but subsequent UN documents refer to the HIPPO 
recommending a “Vanguard Brigade,” and to the Secretary-General endorsing “the development 
of a UN Vanguard Capability…[of] approximately 4,000 troops and police” (UNDPO 2019b, 3).  
In July 2015, UNSAS was indeed replaced, not least because the USA insisted on a more 
effective mechanism to register pledges being in place before it hosted the September 2015 
                                                 
9 There was ambiguity about whether this would be a standby or standing capability.  
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Leaders’ Summit on UN Peacekeeping (Interview 6). In apparent contradiction to the First Brigade 
policy paradigm, the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (PCRS) did not focus solely on 
a small, rapidly deployable initial presence: it was designed to include “sufficient capabilities…for 
the potential deployment of a new medium sized peacekeeping mission (approx. 15,000 troops and 
police)” (UNDPKO 2016, 9). However, this structure did not reflect an expanded rapid 
deployment ambition, but a perceived dual purpose for the PCRS: “we needed two different things, 
right? We needed a reserve system for normal deployments, and we needed something more rapid” 
(Interview 3). This bifurcation marks the consolidation of the First Brigade policy paradigm 
despite – and in isolation from – a broader policy debate about persistent capability gaps and 
capacity deficits in UN peacekeeping operations.10 With rare exceptions (Rappa 2016), these 
broader force generation challenges were seen as distinct from the much more narrowly defined 
rapid deployment issue: “the PCRS wasn’t primarily about rapid deployment… [It] wasn’t 
primarily about speed, it was primarily about quality” (Interview 6).  
The PCRS thus features four levels of pledged capabilities, only one of which is dedicated to 
rapid deployment. Levels 1 and 2, which include the vast majority of pledged units (UNDPO 
2019a), address the issue of troop contribution quality by allowing for improved recording and 
verification of pledges. Neither level specifies deployment timelines, though enhanced visibility 
may modestly increase deployment speed. By contrast, Level 4 is the designated Rapid 
Deployment Level (RDL), reserved for units “willing and able to be deployed in under 60 days” 
(UNDPKO 2016, 7). Fully reflecting the First Brigade policy paradigm, it effectively houses the 
UN Vanguard Capability and aims to comprise only “the capabilities of one integrated brigade 
(approx. 4,000 troops)” (UNDPKO 2016, 9). Thus, the RDL is “up to a brigade and then it’s full” 
(Interview 6). Confirming the sharp separation policy-makers perceived between issues of 
‘quality’ and ‘speed,’ Level 3, which bridges Levels 2 and 4 by beginning administrative 
procedures for deploying pledged contingents, was initially “probably the most debated level 
internally, whether it’s necessary or not” (Interview 3). 
Subsequent implementation efforts further underlined the centrality of the “first brigade” 
approach to rapid deployment. The September 2016 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in 
                                                 
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point. 
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London – despite again noting persistent capability gaps – discussed rapid deployment in terms of 
“a Vanguard Brigade of 4000 troops” (London 2016, 5-7). It generated pledges “for rapidly 
deployable capabilities” that would “help to develop the vanguard brigade concept” (UNSG 
2017b, §39). A March 2017 UN diplomatic workshop hosted by Bangladesh identified the goal of 
having states “commit on an annual basis to keeping a combined 4,000 of their troops and police 
at a high-state of readiness (deployable within 60 days) to retain the required capabilities for the 
vanguard concept” (Bangladesh 2017, 1). UN Secretariat presentations focused on the “UN 
Vanguard Concept” (de Koning 2017) and the “Vanguard Brigade Structure” (Smith 2017). The 
November 2017 Vancouver UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial saw Secretariat officials 
making a similarly “dedicated outreach effort to make sure we secured pledges for the RDL” 
(Interview 6). A proposal in the UN’s Contingent Owned Equipment Working Group (2017) to 
partially reimburse states for the maintenance costs of pledged rapidly deployable units also 
focused on the RDL,11 and the General Assembly approved the measure for RDL units only (UN 
2017, §46). Level 3, a potential repository for additional more rapidly deployable units, atrophied 
in this period (UNDPKO 2016), partly because PCRS officials dedicated “the resources we had… 
mostly to figuring out the RDL” (Interview 6). In 2017, focus on and pledged capabilities in Level 
3 increased (UNDPO 2019a), but it tended to be seen as providing “fall back units” in case RDL 
units failed to deploy rather than a supplemental rapid deployment capacity (Ulich 2017).12 
Training proposals, meanwhile, also focused on the “vanguard capability” through field exercises 
for RDL contributors planned in 2017 (UNSG 2017a) and 2019 (Interviews 3 and 4).  
Some participants in the 2010s debate maintained, however, that standby arrangements could 
not satisfactorily address the UN’s rapid deployment challenges. The World Federalist Movement, 
for example, argued in a submission to the HIPPO that “peacekeeping challenges require standing, 
not just standby, capacities” (Langille 2015, 1-2). In contrast to standby arrangements, standing 
capacities are under direct UN control and can be activated by the Security Council without further 
negotiations with troop-contributing countries. Advocacy for this mechanism dates back to 
Secretary-General Trygve Lie’s proposals for a standing UN force in the 1940s and 1950s 
(McCarthy 2000, 141) and was revived in the 1990s by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali (UNSG 
                                                 
11 Reimbursement is conditional on the unit rapidly deploying when requested.  
12 See below for further discussion. Level 3 initially included a 90-day deployment timeline, which was subsequently 
removed. It also has functions other than rapid deployment. 
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1992, §43) and former Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart (1993). Despite their Charter 
commitment to provide the forces “necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security” (UN 1945, §43.1), UN member states have long refused to cede this degree of 
autonomy to the UN (Macfarlane 2007). Nevertheless, advocacy for this mechanism persisted in 
the 2010s, taking two main forms – both of which reflected a “first brigade” definition of rapid 
deployment.  
The more ambitious form proposed creating a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), staffed 
by volunteer personnel and available for immediate deployment at the Security Council’s 
direction. This was the concept the World Federalist Movement proposed to the HIPPO (Langille 
2015, 2-4). UNEPS also enjoyed support from other scholars, civil society organizations, and some 
retired UN officials (Herro 2015; Johansen 2006). Advocates differed on UNEPS’s exact size: a 
2005 experts’ discussion recommended 12,000-15,000 personnel (Johansen 2006), Herro (2015) 
10,000 troops, and Langille (2016) 13,500. Proposals in the 2010s specified, however, that UNEPS 
would not deploy all its personnel together. Langille (2016, 46) envisioned “two brigade groups” 
available for two possible missions. Herro (2015, 126) saw UNEPS personnel “divided between 
two mobile mission headquarters which means that a UNEPS operation might only comprise 5,000 
of them.” Thus, both proposals shared the vision of a rapid deployable brigade-size force. Serving 
UN officials, however, tend to dismiss UNEPS’s emphasis on standing capabilities as unrealistic: 
“That’s like saying the veto should be abolished. No, of course it’s not feasible” (Interview 6). 
The more modest standing capacities mechanism focuses more narrowly on mission 
headquarters. Proposals for a rapidly deployable headquarters have been discussed since the 1990s 
(UN 1996b). The HIPPO renewed this impetus by advocating a rapidly deployable “integrated 
civilian, military and police headquarters capacity” (UN 2015, §201). The proposal gained some 
traction, with secretariat members seeking to further develop the concept (de Koning 2017). By 
2019, a “Permanent Core Command Element” of 14 military personnel was envisioned within UN 
Headquarters (UNDPO 2019b, Annex A), though not all affected officials knew they were 
assigned to it (Interview 3). Koops and Novosseloff (2017, 438) interpret this as signaling that “the 
UN Secretariat and member states have scaled down their ambitions from the model of a full-
fledged brigade in the 1990s and early 2000s to a more limited tool.” However, the rapidly 
deployable headquarters proposals were pursued in tandem with efforts to develop the Vanguard 
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Capability within the PCRS (de Koning 2017; UNDPO 2019b). The standing headquarters 
capacity was intended to provide the leadership element for pledged units in order to allow the UN 
to rapidly deploy an integrated brigade-sized force.  
The third rapid deployment mechanism advocated in the 2010s focused on UN/regional 
peacekeeping partnerships, envisioning regional organizations – long assumed to be nimbler in 
responding to local crises (ICISS 2001, 53) – as providers of “bridging missions” in advance of a 
UN deployment. UN/regional peacekeeping partnerships might also provide other advantages, 
including local legitimacy and greater enforcement capacities (AUPSC 2015), but in rapid 
deployment terms the expected benefits were three-fold: an early non-UN peacekeeping presence 
could deliver immediate operational benefits; prepare the ground politically and logistically for a 
subsequent UN mission; and be incorporated (“re-hatted”) into the follow-on UN mission, thus 
providing a core UN presence that could be supplemented with further personnel and equipment.  
This mechanism – often seen as a complement rather than substitute for improved UN stand-
by arrangements – attracted considerable support. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Field 
Support suggested in 2014 that regional organizations “played an important role in ensuring rapid 
deployment” and that “re-hatting regional forces as Blue Helmets could become a more regular 
feature of [UN] missions” (UN 2014). A 2015 brief drafted for AU meetings with the HIPPO 
stressed “a partnership model” where AU or subregional bodies “acted as first responders to 
African crises” and deployed personnel was subsequently “re-hatted and became UN 
peacekeepers” (AU 2015). The HIPPO report highlighted that regional actors could “provide the 
Security Council with a significant first-response capacity where slower-deploying and lower-
capacity United Nations peace operations are not a viable option” (UN 2015, §202-3). The UN 
Secretary-General announced his intention to explore with the AU and the EU how regional 
capacities may serve as “bridging forces pending the mobilization and deployment of a United 
Nations mission” (UNSG 2015b, §31). In fact, sequential regional and UN peace operations had 
already become common, especially in Africa. Re-hatting regional bridging missions was thus an 
established part of the UN’s rapid deployment “toolbox”, though there was continued debate about 
the challenges of re-hatting personnel (UNSG 2015a) and UN financial and logistical support to 
regional actors (Coleman 2017, Coleman and Williams 2017). 
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The regional partnership mechanism also reflects a “first brigade” approach to the rapid 
deployment issue. Regional bridging forces were envisioned to “act as a first response to larger-
scale United Nations missions” (UN 2008, §39). Empirically, while it is not impossible for regional 
organizations to deploy larger forces – AMISOM deployed over 22,000 troops – re-hatted regional 
missions in Liberia, Burundi, Sudan, Ivory Coast, and the Central African Republic numbered 
3,600, 3,250, 7,700, 1,500, and 5,739 troops, respectively, with only the mission in Mali as an 
outlier at 9,620 (Williams 2016, 14-5). All were replaced by significantly larger UN forces. 
Institutionally, the main mechanisms by which regional actors sought to create a rapid response 
capacity also focused on a brigade capacity. The African Union Standby Force envisions five 
regional brigades of approximately 5,000 personnel. Any given deployment is expected to involve 
just one brigade: planning documents focus on logistic support “for a brigade-sized mission” and 
indicate cost projections “based on a Brigade size force” (AU 2010, 49, 20). Meanwhile, 
difficulties in advancing the African Union Standby Force to operational readiness led African 
states to create the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis in 2013, a temporary 
alternative mechanism drawing on states throughout the continent rather than subregions. It, too, 
was a brigade-size capacity of 5,000 military personnel (Langille 2014, 20).  
In short, the debates about UN rapid deployment in the 2010s took place within an international 
policy paradigm that defined rapid deployment primarily in terms of quickly establishing an initial, 
roughly brigade-size presence. The impact of this First Brigade policy paradigm is apparent in the 
striking consensus on this problem definition and policy goal among national diplomats, UN 
officials, and experts, even as they vigorously debated the relative merits of stand-by 
arrangements, standing capabilities, and regional/UN partnerships as the mechanisms for 
achieving it. 
 
The Deficiency of an Operational-Functionalist Explanation for the First Brigade Policy 
Paradigm 
Does the First Brigade policy paradigm reflect the operational lessons learned from 
peacekeeping deployments since the 1990s? We argue that this operational-functionalist 
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explanation for the paradigm’s emergence fails. It is contradicted by three facts about 
contemporary UN peace operations. First, they are routinely mandated to include more than one 
brigade of military personnel, and mandated troop ceilings themselves are often conservative 
compared to the tasks identified for the mission. Second, the rapid deployment of an initial 
vanguard presence does not reliably speed up full deployment of the mandated force. Third, the 
gap between initial and full deployment has repeatedly created significant operational risks in UN 
peace operations. We examine each of these facts in turn. 
 
Size of UN Operations 
UN peacekeeping deployments vary significantly in size, both from mission to mission and 
over the lifespan of a mission. However, participants in the rapid deployment policy debates of the 
2010s had every reason to expect future peace operations to require significantly more than one 
brigade of military personnel. From the 1990s onwards, the Security Council routinely mandated 
missions with considerably higher maximum authorized troop levels (“ceilings”). In our dataset of 
29 UN missions authorized between 1992 and 2016 (Table A.2), the mean initial troop ceiling was 
9,971 troops. In the 2000s, the Security Council authorized initial troops ceilings of 19,555, 
11,200, and 10,000, respectively, for the UN missions in Darfur (2007), Mali (2013), and the 
Central African Republic (2014). 
Moreover, the Security Council tends to set conservative troop ceilings in relation to the 
mandated tasks. Concerns about troop availability and peacekeeping costs often produce personnel 
authorizations set below expert estimates of operational requirements (Coleman 2014, 22). A UN 
Secretariat reconnaissance mission to pre-genocide Rwanda, for example, estimated that 4,500 
peacekeeping troops were needed, but the Council authorized 2,217 troops and 331 military 
observers (UN 1999). Incoming Force Commander Romeo Dallaire faced political pressure to 
reduce his troop request: “I was told, ‘Don’t ask for a brigade, because it ain’t there” (quoted in 
Power 2002, 341). In 1993, when the Secretariat requested 34,000 troops to bolster deterrence and 
protect “safe areas” in former Yugoslavia, but also proposed an interim “light option” of 7,600 
troops (UN 1993), the Council authorized only 7,600 troops. Similarly, in 2011, an assessment 
 18 
 
team proposed three options for the new UN mission in South Sudan, with troop requirements 
ranging from 1,000 to 12,000 depending on the mandate’s ambition. After pressure from the USA, 
UNMISS was given a highly ambitious mandate but the troop ceiling was set at 7,000, the level 
originally suggested for the intermediate, moderately ambitious option (Dijkstra 2015). Only after 
the 2013 violence was the ceiling increased to 12,500, rising to 17,000 in 2016. In 2017, the 
Security Council reduced the troop ceilings for the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo despite on-going operational challenges, primarily to achieve cost reductions (Coleman 
2017). In short, “the Council consistently designs its missions well below recommended military–
civilian ratios” (Williams 2019). While a full explanation of Council decision-making on troop 
ceilings is beyond the scope of this article, the critical empirical insight for the purposes of studying 
rapid deployment reform proposals is that these ceilings reflect the resources Council members 
believe are available and can agree to spend, which may be considerably less than a mission’s 
actual operational requirements. Limiting rapid deployment targets to only a fraction of these 
resources exacerbates the problem. 
 
Rapid Initial Deployment Does Not Speed Up Full Deployment 
The First Brigade policy paradigm could still be explained along operational-functionalist lines 
if experience had shown that a rapid initial deployment – of a brigade or less – systematically 
speeds up full deployment. Some UN experts do point to the logistical advantages of an initial 
presence: “If you get your headquarters and… some of your engineering, basically your 
vanguard… that provides your leg on the ground for the rest to deploy relatively easy” (Interview 
4). Yet others caution that logistics is only one aspect of deployment speed: “once [an early 
capacity] is there, it does have a foot on the ground, but it doesn’t necessarily make it easier to get 
the rest in, because that again is just dependent on the vagaries of nations, political will, transport, 
and a whole raft of other things” (Interview 8). The empirical evidence supports this more skeptical 
position, again suggesting that the First Brigade policy paradigm did not arise from the lessons of 
operational experience.  
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For each of the 29 missions in our dataset, we recorded the troop ceilings authorized by the 
Security Council in the first mandate and, where applicable, all subsequent mission expansions.13 
We compared these ceilings to the number of troops actually deployed, using data from the IPI 
Peacekeeping Database (Perry and Smith 2013). Because missions vary in size, we define 
deployment speed in relation to the attainment of proportional deployment thresholds set at the 
25th and 75th deployment percentiles. The 25th percentile reflects a meaningful vanguard in relation 
to the entire force. In many missions, this approximates the first brigade.14 The 75 percent threshold 
quantifies what may be termed substantial deployment, a military presence large enough to 
approximate the intended force size, yet low enough to be reached by the majority of UN missions. 
For example, if a mission has authorized size of 12,000 troops, the 25th percentile threshold 
corresponds to 3,000 troops and the 75th to 9,000 troops.  
Within this framework, T25 is the time to deploy 25 percent of the authorized troops and T75 
the time to reach the 75 percent deployment, counting in days from the Security Council’s initial 
authorization. Figure 1 plots the missions in our dataset based on their time to initial deployment 
(T25) and the time they required to progress to substantial deployment (T75 – T25). If rapid initial 
deployment leads to rapid full deployment, we would expect to see a positive correlation between 
the two measures: in missions where the UN was able to rapidly deploy the initial contingent – 
either independently or via re-hatting arrangements – we should also observe a more rapid 
deployment of a more substantial force. However, the data suggest no apparent relationship. There 
are exceptions, but missions that manage to deploy a vanguard force rapidly are typically no faster 
than others in getting from there to full deployment. Likewise, missions that are slow initially, 
deploying their vanguard force with some delay, are not slower than others in attaining fuller 
deployment. For example, UNMEE (in Ethiopia/Eritrea) was slow to reach initial deployment but 
fast to deploy the remainder of the force, whereas MINUSMA (Mali) was fast initially (largely 
because of re-hatting), but very slow in getting additional troops in place. The visual impression 
from Figure 1 is statistically corroborated: the correlation between T25 and T75 – T25 for the 
missions in our sample is a mere 0.04, suggesting that whether initial deployment is fast or slow 
does not reliably predict whether a mission will reach full deployment quickly.  
                                                 
13 Data gathered from UN Security Council resolutions and Secretary-General reports.  
14 For military planners, a brigade can range from 1,500 to 5,000 troops. 
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By distinguishing between re-hatted missions and entirely new deployments, Figure 1 provides 
an additional insight. We observe that re-hatted missions cluster to the left in the plot, indicating 
rapid initial deployment, but exhibit variance in the vertical dimension that represents progress to 
substantial deployment. In other words, while re-hatting may allow the UN to achieve rapid initial 
deployment (in the technical sense), such missions are no faster on average than other missions in 
attaining higher levels of deployment. This suggests that re-hatting has functioned as a substitute 
rather than supplement for independent UN rapid deployment capabilities, potentially diminishing 
the perceived urgency of additional UN deployments. This is echoed in the following 
understanding of the relationship between re-hatting and the PCRS: “We could mix and match… 
if they provided certain capabilities and we could pull other capabilities off the RDL to match that, 
so we don’t have to deploy the whole thing together” (Interview 3). Defining rapid deployment in 
terms of a first brigade encourages this approach: re-hatted and independent UN capabilities are 
substitutes if the goal is deploying one brigade. By contrast, if the goal is rapid full deployment 
these capabilities are supplementary: the need for rapid deployment of additional UN troops does 
not abate at the moment of re-hatting. Indeed, if the preceding smaller regional force were 






Figure 1: Deployment times by mission  
 
Figure 2 further confirms that rapid initial deployment has not reliably entailed rapid full 
deployment of UN missions. It presents our data in the form of deployment curves, grouping all 
missions from the same decade into one curve. We use inverted Kaplan-Meier estimates, which 
exhibit the share of troops that have deployed at each time interval. One key pattern stands out. 
Missions in the 2010s – after two decades of UN reforms focused primarily on rapid initial 
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deployment – were faster to reach the 25 percent threshold than missions in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Strikingly, however, they were slower to reach other deployment thresholds. In other words, more 
recent missions have been fast to field an initial presence, likely reflecting the increased reliance 
on re-hatting arrangements, but relatively slow to attain substantial deployment. In contrast, 
missions authorized in the 2000s took longer to reach initial deployment, but once underway, they 
(and missions in the 1990s) reached substantial deployment within a shorter time.15  
 
 
Figure 2: Proportional deployment of UN peacekeepers by days since authorization, by decade 
(Kaplan-Meier estimates) 
 
                                                 
15 These differences do not appear to be driven by variation in mission size. Missions established in the 2010s were 
smaller, on average, than missions in the 1990s or 2000s. If very large missions from the 1990s such as UNISOM are 
excluded, the average size of missions from each decade is roughly equal (9,980 troops in the 1990s; 11,667 in the 
2000s; and 10,597 in the 2010s). 
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A Dangerous Gap 
An operational-functionalist explanation for the First Brigade Policy Paradigm might still hold 
if experience suggests that a rapid initial deployment – even in the absence of more rapid full 
deployment – consistently represents an operational benefit. The more modest version of this 
argument would suggest that the initial deployment allows the UN to have at least some positive 
effect, even if the larger mission is slow to materialize. As one UN official put it, “I think that 
initial operating capability is really important… so you can start to have an impact as quickly as 
you can, so expectations a little bit are met” (Interview 8). The maximalist version of the argument 
would be that the initial deployment might be so effective that full deployment is no longer as 
necessary, explaining the lack of impact on rapid full deployment by a lack of urgency.16 
Two considerations undermine this line of argumentation. First, as noted at the beginning of 
this article, size matters in peacekeeping missions (Hultman et al. 2013), and a partial deployment 
does not constitute a comprehensive solution. In none of the missions examined here do we observe 
that rapid initial deployment led to early reductions of the troop ceiling. Instead, we observe that 
missions gradually – sometimes very gradually – move towards more substantial deployment, 
suggesting on-going force generation efforts that are presumably predicated on the mission’s 
continued need for these units. The UN’s practice of issuing regular updates about current and 
emerging capability requirements – including in specific missions – also suggests that continued 
gaps are seen as liabilities.  
Second, there is ample historical evidence that a gap between initial and full deployment 
creates operational risks for UN operations. In Sierra Leone, the “painfully slow” deployment of 
UN troops led to 500 peacekeepers being taken hostage by the rebels in May 2000. While a British 
intervention helped free the hostages and a dramatic increase in UNAMSIL’s strength, funding, 
logistic support, and political backing allowed the mission to recover, the episode put peacekeepers 
at risk, jeopardized Sierra Leone’s peace process, and humiliated the UN (Hirsch 2004).  
In Haiti, MINUSTAH (created in 2004) benefitted from the “re-hatting” of a small Chilean 
contingent and the quick deployment of a Brazilian “[b]rigade with 1,200 officers” to achieve “one 
                                                 
16 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility. 
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of the shortest [initial deployment times] in [UN] history” (Braga 2017, 37-8). After this initial 
deployment, however, “the UN was excessively slow in obtaining troops from other Member 
Countries”: MINUSTAH did not reach the full strength for a year and therefore had to “act with 
far fewer troops than planned at critical moments” (Braga 2017, 38). This incomplete deployment 
left “a security vacuum” that had “disastrous consequences” (International Crisis Group 2004, i). 
Supporters of the former Haitian president, who fled the country because of popular protests, “were 
encouraged by the modest size of the MINUSTAH contingent – initially only 3,000 troops” (Biato 
2011, 194) and fomented unrest to enable his return. The disbanded Haitian army occupied 
abandoned police stations (Johnstone 2006, 42), weakening the legitimacy of the interim 
government that MINUSTAH supported. MINUSTAH’s inability to stabilize Haiti harmed its 
relations with the local population, whose “initial open-armed support for the UN troops was 
affected by the lack of improving conditions” (Biato 2011, 194). Moreover, the delayed arrival of 
the rest of the force undermined the morale of already deployed MINUSTAH contingents. 
Brazilian troops, whose area of responsibility was supposed to be only the capital, had to spread 
to another seven bases across the country, which required “a huge logistical and operational effort” 
(Vieira Neto 2017, 18) and put “considerable pressure on the Brazilian contingent” (Braga 2017, 
38).  
The UN operation in Mali, MINUSMA, provided another example of the risks created by a 
gap between initial and full deployment. MINUSMA replaced a regional security force, AFISMA, 
and 6,161 regional troops were re-hatted as UN peacekeepers, representing 55 percent of 
MINUSMA’s authorized strength (UN 2018). Yet seven months later, the mission still hovered 
around half its mandated size “in an increasingly volatile security situation” (Lotze 2015, 862). It 
struggled to establish a presence in northern Mali (Reuters 2014b), and its slow deployment there 
was blamed for enabling a wave of Islamist attacks: France’s defense minister charged that 
“Northern Mali has been weakened because MINUSMA was not there at the moment it needed to 
be” (Reuters 2014a). MINUSMA’s inability to counter this challenge effectively undermined both 
the mission’s credibility and the authority of the Malian government it supported. MINUSMA has 
struggled to recover. By 2016, it used more than 80 percent of its military capacity on force 
protection instead of substantive tasks (International Peace Institute 2016). It nevertheless became 
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“the UN’s most dangerous mission” (UN 2019c), losing more than 200 peacekeepers by 2019 (UN 
2019b).  
There is thus evidence that a gap between a rapid initial deployment and slow attainment of 
full mission strength can undermine peace operations – and UN policymakers and experts have 
long recognized this danger. In 2004, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-
Marie Guéhenno cautioned, “if we dribble into a mission, then we project an image of weakness, 
and there is nothing more difficult than to recover from an initial perception of weakness” (Langille 
2014, 1). The 2015 HIPPO report concurred: “When a mission trickles into a highly demanding 
environment, it is dangerously exposed on the ground and initial high expectations turn to 
disappointment, frustration and anger” (UN 2015, 63).  
To be clear, we do not argue that a partial deployment is always less desirable than the absence 
of any action: while posing risks, insufficient deployments can generate short-term benefits, such 
as providing protection for senior mission leaders who engage in mediation or reassuring a portion 
of the population in the capital. However, “[t]he problem is… if the situation is really quite dicey, 
one brigade is just going to be very vulnerable” (Interview 2). Operational experience has 
demonstrated multiple times that delay between initial and full deployment is risky and 
debilitating. Once the Security Council authorizes a mission of a particular size, delays in fielding 
the expected number of troops expose deployed contingents to risk, encourage spoilers, and 
undermine mission and UN credibility in the eyes of conflict parties and the broader membership. 
While partial deployment may sometimes be preferable to no deployment, there is no operational-
functionalist reason to focus UN reforms on rapid initial deployment rather than rapid full 
deployment. 
In short, the First Brigade policy paradigm did not emerge because participants in the policy 
debate absorbed unambiguous lessons about the importance of an early brigade-sized deployment 
from previous UN peacekeeping experiences. The typical size of UN missions, the fact that rapid 
initial deployment does not reliably speed up full deployment, and the long-recognized dangers of 
slow progress from initial to full deployment undermine operational-functionalist explanations for 
the paradigm’s existence. Instead, “aiming low” dynamics in UN rapid deployment debates 




Protracted Negotiation Dynamics and the Emergence of the First Brigade Policy Paradigm  
While intermittent UN engagement with rapid deployment concerns dates back to at least the 
1960s (Macfarlane 2007), the contemporary policy paradigm has more recent roots. As late as 
2000, the Brahimi Report on UN peace operations highlighted the absence of an agreed definition 
of UN rapid deployment – and, in striking consistency with the conceptual discussion above, 
argued that “enhancing the United Nations capacity for rapid deployment must begin with agreeing 
upon a standard towards which the Organization should strive” (UN 2000, §88). Towards this end, 
the report proposed an ambitious goal definition: “the United Nations should develop the 
operational capabilities to fully deploy ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the 
adoption of a Security Council resolution, and complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days” 
(UN 2000, §§87-8). Yet the seeds of a much less ambitious focus on the rapid deployment of a 
first brigade – rather than rapid full deployment – had already been sown in the 1990s. The Brahimi 
Report represented an attempt to dislodge this emerging consensus. Its failure to do so consolidated 
the narrower definition, leading to its largely unchallenged adoption by policymakers and analysts 
in the 2010s.  
 
Roots of the First Brigade Focus: Negotiating Rapid Deployment in the 1990s 
The 1990s began with considerable optimism about UN peacekeeping, which extended to rapid 
deployment. In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali confidently asserted that “[m]ilitary 
observers and infantry are invariably available in the required numbers” for UN peace operations 
(UNSG 1992, §70-3), though he noted logistics and equipment challenges. In this context, he 
proposed an ambitious definition of rapid deployment: “start-up times to achieve operational self-
sufficiency in general should be no more than 10 days to a month for a small mission (e.g. up to 
500 personnel), two to three months for a medium-sized mission (e.g. up to 5,000 personnel) and 
four to five months for a large mission (e.g. above 5,000 personnel)” (UNSG 1994, §4). By 1994, 
however, UN peacekeeping had descended into crisis. After disastrous developments in former 
Yugoslavia and Somalia, the UN’s failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda – despite already 
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having a mission (UNAMIR) in the country – constituted a critical milestone in the policy debate 
around rapid deployment. It had three key impacts on this debate. 
First, advocates highlighted it as definitive proof of the need for a robust UN rapid deployment 
capacity. Boutros-Ghali (1999, 140) claimed, for example, “if the United Nations’ standby force 
for rapid deployment that I had proposed two years earlier had been agreed upon, the Rwandan 
genocide might never have taken place.” While this interpretation of the UN’s failure in Rwanda 
is contestable – since there was already a mission on the ground, this was arguably not a rapid 
deployment problem (Interview 2) – its political effects were clear: in the aftermath of the 
genocide, the rapid deployment debate assumed renewed urgency. As former French UN diplomat 
François Heisbourg (1998, 195) noted, to make the case for the desirability of a UN rapid-response 
capacity, “it suffices to cite the case of Rwanda.”  
Second, the UN’s failure in Rwanda starkly illustrated the problem of limited state 
commitment to peacekeeping. Western states had withdrawn their support in the wake of 
experiences in Somalia and former Yugoslavia. As noted above, none of the governments that had 
pledged troops under the UN stand-by arrangements were willing to deploy these units when the 
Security Council finally decided to expand UNAMIR. By 1995 it was clear that the availability of 
troops had palpably declined as compared with the UN’s needs (UNSG 1995, §43). Against this 
backdrop, ambitious proposals to improve the UN’s rapid deployment capability appeared utopian. 
In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, several proposals for a standing UN rapid reaction 
capability emerged, championed by Boutros-Ghali (UNSG 1995, §4) as well as scholars, former 
diplomats and experts (Urquhart 1998; Kinloch-Pichat 2004, 144; Herro 2015, 22). Most 
envisioned a force of some 10,000 troops, which was already “generally thought to reflect more 
what is politically attainable than what may be needed operationally” (US Congress 1995, 9). 
Nevertheless, it was quickly deemed unrealistic (Heisbourg 1998, 198). By 1997, Boutros-Ghali’s 
successor Kofi Annan conceded that UN member states were “not ready” for a standing UN army 
(Deen 1997, §19). Italy’s Permanent Representative to the UN succinctly captured how the 
recognition of resource constraints winnowed down the range of reform proposals given 
consideration: “Though many proposals have been made, we must… eliminate the ones that are 
not realistic, attainable, or cost effective” (Fulci 1996, 57). 
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Third, counterfactual arguments about how the genocide might have been avoided suggested 
the viability of a less resource-intensive UN rapid response mechanism. UNAMIR Force 
Commander Dallaire insisted that the genocide might have been prevented with 5,000 troops, or a 
brigade (Kuperman 2001, 84). The 1999 Independent Inquiry into the Rwandan Genocide even 
suggested that a “force numbering 2,500 should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres” 
(UNSC 1999, 30). It was Dallaire’s brigade-size estimate, however, that gained traction. Annan 
endorsed it in 1998: “I agree with General Dallaire when he says, ‘If I had had one reinforced 
brigade – 5,000 men – well trained and well equipped, I could have saved thousands of lives’.” 
(Dorn and Matloff 2000, §3). Human Rights Watch repeated Dallaire’s claim (Des Forges 1999, 
22), as did academics (Leurdijk 1995, 6; McCarthy 2000, 140; Herro 2016, 127). Asked in 2019 
about the origins of the focus on a “first brigade” capacity in UN rapid deployment debates, former 
UN Assistant Secretary-General Ramesh Thakur was clear: “that goes back to what Dallaire said 
about Rwanda, [to] bridge that initial moment” (Interview 9). 
Dallaire’s assessment provided a rationale for a pragmatic policy solution: a brigade-size rapid 
deployment capability was more politically feasible than larger rapid reaction forces (Heisbourg 
1998, 198). This helped brigade-centric proposals gain traction. In 1994, the Netherlands proposed 
a permanent “UN Rapid Deployment Brigade” outside the UNSAS system (SHIRBRIG 2009, 5). 
In 1995, Canada proposed a “Vanguard Concept” for a 5,000-strong multi-functional rapid 
reaction force, explicitly citing Dallaire’s analysis of Rwanda (1995, 5). In 1996, Denmark 
presented a proposal for a “Multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness 
Brigade” (UN 1996a), which was implemented and declared operational in January 2000 
(SHIRBRIG 2009, 6-7).  
 
Failing to Reverse the First Brigade Focus: The Brahimi Report and its Aftermath 
The Brahimi Panel’s proposal to define rapid deployment in terms of the full authorized force 
challenged the “first brigade” focus emerging in the late 1990s. Significantly, the Panel was in a 
position to push back against the resource-constraint lessons gleaned from negotiations in the 
1990s. It could not ignore considerations of political feasibility, as Annan had reminded its 
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members: “He said, ‘Look, you’re free… to say whatever you want. But you need to understand, 
I am not interested in a theoretical document that sounds nice, I need you to give me something 
that actually has a chance of being implemented” (Interview 5). However, the Panel convened 
during a resurgence of UN peacekeeping: its report “was being written against the backdrop of 
four new missions: Sierra Leone, Kosovo, DRC, and Timor-Leste… obviously you need to learn 
from Rwanda and Srebrenica and that has to factor, but it wasn’t the only thing” (Interview 5). The 
panel argued that one recent operational experience – UN peacekeepers having been taken hostage 
in Sierra Leone – fundamentally contradicted the first-brigade approach: “UNAMSIL would 
probably not have faced the difficulties… had it been provided with [stronger] forces... The Panel 
is convinced that NATO military planners would not have agreed to deploy to Sierra Leone with 
only the 6,000 troops initially authorized” (UN 2000, §106). As an independent body, moreover, 
the Panel had leeway to strategically push beyond the established consensus: “You pitch further 
out and you drag everybody along and you get a little bit further, but you don’t get fully to the 
point that you articulated. … [Y]ou push for something you think is in the universe of possible, 
you want to be ambitious and you push for it, but you also recognize that you’re being ambitious” 
(Interview 5). The Secretariat, which was closely involved in the Panel’s work, had hoped that 
ambitious proposals would be more acceptable to member states coming from a group of 
independent experts than from UN officials (Weinlich 2014). 
The Brahimi Report’s proposed focus on rapid full deployment reflected this ambition. To 
reach this policy goal, the Panel recommended that UNSAS “be developed further to include 
several coherent, multinational, brigade size forces and the necessary enabling forces.” (UN 2000, 
xi). These should be “available for full deployment to an operation within 30 days in the case of 
traditional peacekeeping operations and within 90 days in the case of complex operations” (UN 
2000, §115). The report acknowledged SHIRBRIG as a model but explicitly sought to expand the 
UN’s rapid deployment capacity beyond it. 
However, the Brahimi Panel’s efforts to refocus the policy debate on rapid full deployment 
failed. Its timelines proved seminal: the 30/90-day timeframes were endorsed by the Secretary-
General (UNSG 2000, §§67-8) and the Security Council (UNSC 2000, 4), and became the 
(aspirational) standard against which UN deployments were measured (Langille 2014, 1-2) until 
the PCRS introduced a standardized 60-day rapid deployment window in 2015. However, the 
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timelines were rapidly divorced from the focus on rapid full deployment, which did not gain 
traction. Within two months of the report’s release, the UN Secretary-General – having gauged 
initial state reactions – deemphasized the “coherent brigade-size forces” proposal: “I do not 
anticipate that the Panel expects this recommendation to be fully implemented immediately” 
(UNSG 2000, §85). While promising further consultations, he focused on less ambitious Brahimi 
recommendations for improving UNSAS (UNSG 2000, §§77-90). In December 2000, the UN’s 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations endorsed modest UNSAS improvements but did 
not comment on the “coherent brigade-size forces” proposal. It also omitted the word “fully” from 
the Brahimi timelines, identifying “the goal of being able to deploy peacekeeping operations 
within 30 days… and to deploy complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days” (UNGA 2000, 
§§15-22).  
Subsequent reforms cemented this distancing from rapid full deployment as a policy goal. In 
July 2002, UNSAS gained a Rapid Deployment Level for resources to be deployed within the 
Brahimi Report’s 30/90-day timeframes. The Level’s size was not specified, but it was deemed 
“unlikely that all of the required contingents for either a traditional or complex UN PKO [would] 
be fielded from the RDL”: the concept was for “some RDL units/resources [to] be deployed 
thereby enhancing the UN’s ability to more rapidly initiate a mission” (UN 2003). Initial hopes 
that SHIRBRIG nations would join the RDL (Durch et al. 2003, 72) failed to materialize, as did 
the “coherent Brigade Units” invited from other sub-regional organizations (UNDPKO 2003, 10-
11). By 2010, only four states had pledged resources: “two infantry companies, a special force 
platoon and five water treatment plants” (UNOIOS 2010, 11). Even as UN peacekeeping surged, 
with troop deployments skyrocketing from 30,000 in early 2000 to 80,000-90,000 in the 2010s, 
available resource commitments for rapid deployment appeared minimal. 
 
The First Brigade Paradigm as Axiomatic 
Contemporary UN policymakers and experts tend to dismiss out of hand the possibility of 
focusing on rapid full deployment as a policy goal: “I haven’t heard anyone talk about, ‘Let’s get 
an entire mission up and running in three months.’ … I mean, people think it’s extremely ambitious 
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to deploy any units within sixty days, so to think we could have the whole thing up and running… 
within three months, I think you would get laughed out of the room” (Interview 6). Another expert 
confirmed, “The whole mission, I don’t think we’ll see that done by the UN” (Interview 4). As 
former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno explained, “the pros of 
a rapid deployment of the whole mission are very strong of course… [But] you have to be realistic 
based on what is feasible and what isn’t” (Interview 7). Strikingly, the very fact that the Brahimi 
Report focused on full deployment appears to have been forgotten. The first brigade focus has thus 
become the unquestioned default approach. As noted above, it is accepted by advocates of all three 
key proposed mechanisms for UN rapid deployment. The 2015 creation of the PCRS highlights its 
largely axiomatic nature. 
The PCRS was largely designed by UN Secretariat officials, in the context of a strong, United 
States-led push to reinvigorate UN peacekeeping that culminated in the September 2015 Leaders’ 
Summit on Peacekeeping co-chaired by President Obama in New York: “you have to remember 
this all happened during the summit year, so the political momentum and the political buy-in and 
support was enormous. And the United States in particular had also said… ‘We’re extremely keen 
for us to have a system in place where the new pledges could be registered and a system that was 
a bit more serious than UNSAS’” (Interview 6). For PCRS architects, the need for a rapid 
deployment level was obvious: “The fact that we added the RDL on top of that was kind of a 
natural thing to do… because we know we have needs that need to be met quickly” (Interview 6). 
The RDL’s size also elicited strikingly little debate. Asked why it comprises one brigade, one 
PCRS architect replied,  
That’s a good question. … They were developing this Vanguard Brigade concept when I arrived at the UN... 
We just kind of latched onto it. … To be honest, there hasn’t been a lot of discussion about whether that’s 
the right size or not. I think there was some initially when it was presented. Once the brigade-sized RDL was 
accepted legislatively, there hasn’t been further discussion on its size. (Interview 3) 
Another PCRS architect confirmed, “To do anything bigger than that, people would have probably 
questioned our sense of realism. It seemed like the right size, I don’t know. There wasn’t a huge 
amount of debate about the total size of it” (Interview 6).  
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Once questioned about the RDL’s size, UN officials typically defend it. One defense is that a 
brigade is a logical size: “I guess it was seen to be kind of the minimum size operating force to 
insert into a country in a semi-permissive or non-permissive environment. You wouldn’t want 
anything smaller than that” (Interview 3). Yet this does not preclude attempting to secure multiple 
rapidly deployable brigades, as the Brahimi Report recommended. Focusing rapid deployment 
efforts on a single brigade is thus also defended on capacity grounds: “there are those of us who 
worry about even being able to deploy just a brigade rapidly, because of our limited ability to move 
quickly and do things” (Interview 3). There is also the potential of Level 3 of the PCRS, which has 
begun to include more units, acting not only as a backstop to the RDL but as a more substantial 
supplement facilitating deployment of a second wave of units after the first element of the mission 
arrives. As of November 2019, however, the RDL and Level 3 jointly included 5 pledged infantry 
battalions, which represents 4,250 troops (UNDPKO 2017) compared to 27 battalions at Levels 1 
and 2 (UNDPO 2019c). Fundamentally, however, the RDL’s size is linked to political feasibility 
considerations. One consideration is financial: “It was about what member states were willing to 
[support] – because we pay for these units, we do reimburse these units who are on the RDL” 
(Interview 3). Put differently, “everything is driven by money. I mean, just getting the RDL to get 
one quarter of their maintenance costs for the year, that was a huge fight” (Interview 4). Indonesia’s 
(2017) proposal to extend modest readiness reimbursements to Level 3 units failed to gain support. 
Another consideration was troop availability: “maybe just by experience, the ability to get more 
than one brigade proved impossible in those timeframes” (Interview 5). In short, “If you want to 
mobilize twenty thousand troops, the commitment of member states is just not there for such 
undertakings. There is no appetite for that. So, if you shoot for the moon, you will not get the 
smaller prize that you are aiming for” (Interview 7). 
Thus, once alerted to the first brigade policy paradigm, experts and officials defend it less on 
operational merits than on grounds of political feasibility, as demonstrated by accumulated 
negotiation experiences. A former top UN official succinctly captured the dynamics of paradigm 
emergence in the face of intractable policy problems: “All these other objectives are attempts to 
find intermediary steps to get faster. I don’t think you can see more into these evolving goals than 





When large, heterogeneous IOs attempt to address difficult policy issues, reform negotiations 
are often protracted, extending over decades and multiple rounds. When they produce institutional 
solutions that fail to resolve the underlying problem, one diagnosis is deficient political will, 
masked by organized hypocrisy (Brunsson 1989) or “empty institutions” (Dimitrov 2019). In this 
article, we have highlighted a different dynamic, suggesting that protracted negotiations can give 
rise to international policy paradigms that prevent even committed advocates from developing 
fully effective ways of addressing challenges.  
International policy paradigms structure debate among national diplomats, IO officials, and 
independent experts by providing shared issue and policy goal definitions that negotiators accept 
even as they disagree on the optimal choice of policy instruments. We thus foreground a role for 
ideas in IOs that reaches beyond the relatively small, homogeneous groups of actors susceptible to 
groupthink or organizational culture.  
Indeed, drawing on the multilateral negotiations literature, we conceptualized the emergence 
of policy paradigms where existing scholarship least expects it: in large, heterogenous IOs. The 
complexity of negotiations in these settings raises the risk of negotiation failure. International 
policy paradigms emerge and are valued because they help avert organizational paralysis by 
preventing continuous return to definitional debates. These origins differ significantly from the 
cognitive consensus highlighted by Hall (1993) and subsequent work on policy paradigms in 
Comparative Politics and, to a lesser extent, International Relations. However, the resulting 
paradigms are not necessarily less robust. An issue definition representing a mutually acceptable 
basis for negotiation in heterogeneous institutions is not lightly discarded, and over time may 
become taken for granted. 
Yet because these international policy paradigms emerge primarily from the dynamics of 
protracted IO negotiations, rather than close operational analysis of the policy problem at hand, 
they also pose a risk. What is politically achievable at any given time is not necessarily what is 
required to fully address a policy problem. Pragmatic decisions to focus on one aspect of the issue 
become problematic when they lose their temporary quality. International policy paradigms that 
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emerge from these decisions, entrenching partial (though mutually acceptable) issue definitions 
and policy goals, divert policymakers’ attention from the larger policy problem and thus create the 
potential for suboptimal effects. 
The persistent challenge of UN rapid deployment provides a striking illustration of this 
dynamic. There is broad consensus on the importance of deploying peacekeeping operations 
quickly, and considerable debate about how to enhance the UN’s rapid deployment capacity. 
Underlying this debate, however, is a remarkable consensus: rapid deployment is consistently 
interpreted narrowly as quickly establishing an initial, usually brigade-sized UN presence. The 
alternative goal definition of rapidly deploying the entire authorized mission – last advocated in 
the 2000 Brahimi Report – is typically ignored or dismissed out of hand. Thus, contemporary 
debate about UN rapid deployment takes place within a “First Brigade” international policy 
paradigm. 
This policy paradigm cannot be attributed to shared operational experiences or lessons learned. 
UN missions are routinely larger than one brigade. Delays between initial and full deployment are 
well understood to generate significant operational challenges. The empirical evidence does not 
support optimism that a rapidly deployed initial presence reliably speeds up the arrival of the 
remainder of the peacekeeping force. Indeed, we have shown that the association between rapid 
initial deployment and rapid deployment of the entire force is not only weak but also weakening 
over time. Instead, the First Brigade policy paradigm emerged because its focus is politically 
acceptable: it establishes an important but relatively achievable goal that resource-conscious 
member states can endorse. Rooted in the UN peacekeeping crisis of the 1990s – especially in 
Rwanda – and confirmed with the defeat of the Brahimi definition in the early 2000s, the paradigm 
now provides a largely unquestioned framework within which diplomats and experts debate the 
relative merit of standby arrangements, standing capabilities, and UN/regional partnerships as 
rapid deployment mechanisms. Unfortunately, however, quickly establishing an initial presence is 
at best a partial solution to the UN’s rapid deployment challenge. The First Brigade policy 
paradigm obscures the problem of rapidly reaching full mission strength, which Security Council 
resolutions identify as required for mandate implementation. The immediate policy implication of 
our findings is thus that the contemporary UN rapid deployment debate should expand its focus. 
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Efforts to further enhance initial deployment mechanisms should be complemented by renewed 
consideration of the broader challenge of quickly deploying whole peacekeeping missions.  
In more conceptual terms, our findings suggest paying more attention to how policy paradigms 
may emerge and become entrenched even in large and heterogeneous IOs. There is no shortage of 
protracted IO negotiations in which international policy paradigms may emerge. Climate change 
provides one key example; migration management another. Closer to our own focus, we observe 
a focus on rapid deployment of a brigade-sized force in other crisis management organizations as 
well. As discussed above, both the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate 
Response to Crisis focus on brigade-sized deployments. NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task 
Force is 5,000-strong.17 The EU’s initial bold ambition of deploying up to 60,000 troops in sixty 
days, known as the 2003 Helsinki Headline Goal, has been “well-nigh forgotten” (Biscop 2016, 
436): today, the organization has two battalion-sized (approximately 1,500 troops each) 
battlegroups on stand-by. The new, unspoken consensus on this less ambitious goal may be another 
example of international policy paradigm emergence, which deserves a separate study. The fact 
that the focus on a 3,000-5,000-strong rapidly deployable force emerged in several IOs 
simultaneously, regardless of their distinct crisis management approaches and needs, is also 
worthy of investigation. One question is whether, and if so how, policy paradigms may travel 
between IOs. Another research direction is analyzing the roles of different actors in sustaining 
policy paradigms: for example, IO officials, due to the practical and psychological need to 
highlight successes, often seek to legitimize suboptimal approaches in their own eyes and vis-á-
vis their counterparts (von Billerbeck 2020a). Like policy paradigms, self-legitimation discourses 
enable IOs’ action but detract from its effectiveness (von Billerbeck 2020b).  
Finally, our findings raise a caution about incremental reforms, especially in large, 
heterogeneous international organizations. Limited goals initially identified as plausible first steps 
to a larger end may become entrenched as capturing the entire policy issue – rather than merely a 
more manageable subsection of it – through the emergence and consolidation of an international 
policy paradigm. 
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Table A.1. Interviews conducted 
 
Designation Date Interviewee  
Interview 1 26 February 2019 
Former diplomat and top UN official. Remarks not for closer 
attribution. 
Interview 2 17 April 2019 
Prof. Michael W. Doyle, Columbia University. UN Assistant-
Secretary-General for Policy Planning and Special Advisor to 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2001-2003). 
Interview 3 23 April 2019 
Adam Smith, Team Leader, Strategic Force Generation Cell, 
Department of Peace Operations. 
Interview 4 30 April 2019 
Michael Hanrahan. Consultant. Director of Mission Support 
for MINUSCA (2014-2015). Senior official in UNSOA 
(2012-13) and UNAMID (2009-2010). Military Advisor for 
Canadian mission to UN, 2002-2006. 
Interview 5 1 May 2019 
Salman Ahmed. Senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace. UN official (1992-2008), including as 
secretary of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (“Brahimi 
Report”). High-level US official and diplomat (2009-2016). 
Interview 6 3 May 2019 
Oliver Ulich. Senior Officer, Policy and Best Practices 
Service, Department of Peace Operations. 
Interview 7 8 May 2019 
Jean-Marie Guéhenno. UN Under-Secretary-General for 
Peacekeeping Operations (2000-2008). 
Interview 8 17 May 2019 UN official. Remarks not for closer attribution. 
Interview 9 25 May 2019 
Ramesh Thakur. Vice Rector and Senior Vice Rector of the 
UN University and Assistant UN Secretary-General (1998-
2007). Senior Advisor on Reforms to Secretary-General Kofi 







Table A.2. Missions, mission characteristics, and deployment speed  
 
Mission Start Region Type1 T25 T75 
MINURCA 1998 Africa Rehatted 0 0 
MINURCAT 2009 Africa Rehatted 28 89 
MINUSCA 2014 Africa Rehatted 122 122 
MINUSMA 2013 Africa Rehatted 0 274 
MINUSTAH 2004 Americas New 31 184 
MONUC 1999 Africa New 426 610 
ONUB 2004 Africa Rehatted 0 92 
ONUMOZ 1992 Africa New 90 120 
UNAMID 2007 Africa Rehatted 61 639 
UNAMIR 1993 Africa New 61 123 
UNAMSIL 1999 Africa Rehatted 61 61 
UNAVEM 1995 Africa Rehatted 61 214 
UNIFIL 2006 Middle East Rehatted 31 122 
UNIKOM 1993 Middle East New 337 - 
UNISFA 2011 Africa New 0 122 
UNMEE 2000 Africa New 91 181 
UNMIH 1995 Americas New 151 151 
UNMIL 2003 Africa Rehatted 0 123 
UNMIS 2005 Africa New 184 337 
UNMISS 2011 Africa Rehatted 0 0 
UNOCI 2004 Africa Rehatted 31 122 
UNOMSIL 1998 Africa New 0 30 
UNOSOM 1992 Africa New 0 122 
UNPREDEP 1995 Europe Rehatted 0 0 
UNTAC 1992 Asia Rehatted 184 184 
UNTAES 1996 Europe Rehatted 0 90 
UNTAET 1999 Asia Rehatted 120 120 
All    31 184 
 
 
 
